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Abstract




Fuelled by growing public concerns across Europe on the decline of the nation states, excessive regulatory burdens imposed by the EU and democratic deficits of the EU, the issue of the European Union’s impact on its Member States has been on the political agenda for several years now. In this context of a growing politicization of EU membership in a number of Member States, both opponents and proponents of EU integration have used the argument of the EU’s legislative impact to argue their case. The issue is, however, relevant for a wider variety of reasons. 

From the perspective of citizens and business, the legislative impact of the EU is crucial for determining their rights and obligations. Moreover, the effects of EU law on individuals have become more diverse. In the context of the Internal market, individuals have mostly benefited from the rights granted to them which could be invoked against Member States. In the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, however, various legislation affects individuals in more adverse – and more intrusive – ways. 

From a governance perspective, the impact of EU legislation is key to understand the relation between the EU level and national levels. This relation has often been viewed through the lens of European integration theories and constitutional models. The translation thereof into democratic arrangements and consequences for national sovereignty have equally received much attention. The very concrete effects of EU legislation on national legal orders and individuals is, however, equally important. 

In 1988, the Commission President at the time, Jacques Delors, made a famous prediction on the impact of EU legislation on the Member States. He claimed that in 10 years’ time, 80 % of economic - and perhaps also of social and fiscal - policy-making would be of EU origin.​[1]​ This prediction has activated public administration and political science scholars to research if this estimate would indeed be supported by facts.​[2]​ The findings of this type of research into the quantitative effects of EU legislation remains, however, ambiguous. 

Thus, more than 25 years after Delors’ prediction the issue has still not been settled, even though the political and societal relevance thereof has only risen since 1988. The EU’s legislative impact has been linked more directly to the principle of state sovereignty. In the United Kingdom, the European Union Act 2011 now stipulates that the status of EU law is dependent on legislative acts (statutory law) of the UK.​[3]​ Moreover, the exercise of legislative powers has been subjected to specific conditions to protect national sovereignty.​[4]​ Similarly, the German constitution regulates not only the transfer of powers to the EU, but also addresses the consequences of legislative authority of the European Union for the national parliament and the Bundesländer. These issues have been key aspects of the German Constitutional Court’s decisions on the measures that have been adopted to address the economic crisis. 

This contribution has two purposes. First, it will seek to develop a legal perspective on the study of the EU’s legislative impact on the Member States. As such, it will add a qualitative approach to complement existing research that has largely been based on quantitative methods. To this end, I will evaluate what relevance general elements of the EU’s legislative system generate, such as the distinction between regulations and directives and the distinction between various methods of integration. Next, I will adopt a ‘bottom-up’ approach by analyzing concrete legislation in three areas in which the relation between the EU and the Member States is a politically sensitive issue. The question how legislative authority between the EU and the Member States is regulated will be analyzed from the perspective of national discretion: to what extent do Member States retain freedom to make policy choices? National discretion would indeed seem the ‘missing link’ in the study of the division of authority between the EU and the Member States. Contrary to popular assumptions, it highlights that a full Europeanization may not necessarily arise as a result of EU legislation. This brings into the picture the second purpose of this contribution which is to apply this legal approach and to argue how EU legislation actually affects the division of authority between the EU and the Member States.

The focus of this contribution is on EU legislation. Admittedly, legislation is only one way in which the European Union affects the Member States. Executive measures, and also decisions of the ECJ, have an substantial impact on the Member States as well. In case of the coordination of economic policies, the executive power of the EU has even risen enormously in the last few years. The result is a perhaps even blurrier relation between Member States’ and EU powers. Nevertheless, legislating remains the prime activity of the EU. It is still the area in which the EUs influence is still the greatest, especially in light of the higher levels of decentralization of executive and judicial powers in the EU.






2. Quantitative analyses of the European Union’s legislative impact

A quantitative approach would perhaps be most obvious to assess the EUs legislative impact on the Member States. A persistent element in the discussion is the estimation that the total volume of the acquis communautaire amounts to around 80.000 pages.​[5]​ Yet, this figure in itself gives no indication of the relative weight of EU legislation in national law. Especially in the Netherlands, a number of studies have been carried out that have addressed this issue. The results thereof have, however, have diverged immensely. Some have come to the conclusion that up to 60 percent of Dutch legislation would be of European origin, whereas others went even further and claimed the percentage to be as high as 80 percent (thereby confirming the prediction of the Delors in the 1980s).​[6]​ Many others have come to much lower percentages, though, of between 8-15 percent.​[7]​ Not only these huge differences are striking, but also that the estimations generally arrive at considerably higher percentages than the studies reveal. Apparently, the perception of the EUs influence on national legal orders is generally overrated. 

But how may the differences in outcomes of the scientific studies be explained? A crucial factor here is the huge variety in research methods. First, most studies provided no analysis of all EU legislation but have instead been based on and limited to specific policy areas. As the intensity of EU legislation varies greatly from one policy area to another, sector-specific research may not easily support general conclusions on the EUs legislative impact. The existence of these substantial differences between policy areas is indeed one of the few general conclusions that may be drawn from quantitative research.  

The sector-specific nature of the findings is not the only issue with regard to quantitative research. Quite a number of studies have concentrated on the effects of EU directives as these affect Member States’ legal orders directly.​[8]​ A closely related strand of research involves relating the number of EU transposition measures to the total amount of legislation that is passed within a year in a given Member State; or to analyze national legislation for references to EU law.​[9]​ All of these methods are problematic in their own way. A concentration on EU directives ignores much other EU legislation, most importantly the fact that EU regulations greatly outnumber EU directives. An analysis of national implementing measures equally overexposes directives, ignoring directly applicable EU law. Analyzing references to EU law in national legislation is problematic as such references may not be explicitly made: Member States are not obliged to refer to underlying EU sources when they adopt legislation. All these studies may, therefore, risk to draw a too narrow picture of the actual impact of EU legislation.

Other issues with regard to quantitative approaches are of a much more fundamental nature. First of all, the impact of EU legislation depends not only on its volume. Comparing for  example the Chocolate directive,​[10]​ to the Services Directive it will be clear that the impact of the latter on the Member States’ legal order is much more substantial.​[11]​ Moreover, these types of legislative measures are not equally spread: the detailed, technical and hardly politically sensitive or controversial type of legislation such as the Chocolate directive represents the much more common type. The Treaty objective of establishing an Internal market has prompted the adoption of numerous product norms and other technical regulation, which usually addresses only a specific and limited number of addressees. 

Another issue concerns the invisible effects of EU law. EU legislation blocks national legislative initiatives that are not compatible with higher EU law. This is far from a theoretical issue. In several Member States, political wishes to restrict immigration of EU citizens as well as third country nationals have in recent years been blocked by EU legislation such as the Family Reunification Directive. The effect of EU legislation remains invisible in such cases, and may therefore not be quantified. This blocking effect is, however, undeniably a crucial factor for assessing the impact of EU legislation in the Member States. This issue may even emerge in policy areas in which the legislative powers of the EU are limited or even absent (such as public health protection), but in which the Member States still need to respect e.g. Internal Market provisions. Other invisible effects of EU law may occur in situations in which pre-existing national legislation complies already with newly adopted EU legislation. As national implementation measures are not necessary in such cases, the effect of such EU legislation may be overlooked as well. Still, it impacts national legal orders as Member States are prevented from revoking or amending this national legislation in ways that would not be in line with EU law. 

All in all, analyzing the impact of EU legislation in Member States by applying quantitative methods has both fundamental and practical drawbacks. This may explain the substantial differences in conclusions to which research of this type has led. Consequently, the understanding of the EUs legislative impact on the Member States is incomplete. 


3. Towards a qualitative approach of the EUs legislative impact: general legal tools

From legal system of the EU a number of elements may be derived which are relevant for understanding the impact of the EU on Member States’ legal orders. The type of legal acts is such a relevant factor as the effects of regulations and directives on national legal orders differ and the directive is generally seen as a less intrusive instrument. Secondly, the type of EU power under which legislation is adopted would seem a relevant factor: the system of EU powers consists of a categorization for which the balance between EU and national legislative authority forms the basis. Thirdly, the distinction between different types of harmonization and integration is relevant as the effects on the Member States constitute the distinguishing element. These three elements will be considered in more detail in this section. 

3.1 The nature of EU acts

The Treaty definitions of the regulation and the directive (article 288 TFEU) suggest that regulations are more intrusive instruments than directives. Indeed, directives have been regarded a more flexible instrument as they allow Member States to choose appropriate forms and methods.​[12]​ Similarly, the old Subsidiarity and Proportionality Protocol (attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam) established a preference for directives over regulations as well.​[13]​ 

However, the Inter-institutional agreement on better law-making​[14]​ does not voice such a clear-cut preference for directives, even though it also seeks to add a normative dimension to the choice of legal acts. The Inter-institutional agreement requires the legislature to explain and justify the choice of legislative act (consideration 12) and requires the Commission to strike a ‘proper balance (…) between general principles and detailed provisions, in a manner that avoids excessive use of Community implementing measures’. While this may suggest at least an implicit preference for directives, the Agreement also voices the need for effective and efficient measures, which might be read as an argument in favour of regulations as they are directly applicable.​[15]​

The Commission has taken the argument of effectiveness a step further and derived a preference for regulations from it. In its Communication ‘A Europe of Results’ it stated that regulations (…) ‘reduce the scope for national divergence and the creation of additional burdens (gold plating) through transposition’ and also that ‘(…) replacing directives with regulations can, when legally possible and politically acceptable, offer simplification, as they enable: immediate application and can be directly invoked before courts by interested parties’.​[16]​ Even though the Commission arrives at an opposite conclusion than the one established in the old Subsidiarity Protocol, the underlying assumption remains that directives are less intrusive from a Member States’ perspective. It is only the desirability thereof on which the Commission takes a different stance. 

The legislative practice reveals, however, an ambiguous picture with regard the use of regulations and directives. The ECJ has enabled this ambiguity by allowing the EU legislature to adopt very detailed directives which leave the Member States virtually no policy discretion. In the Enka-case it argued that in view of the objective of the directive it may be necessary to ensure ‘the absolute identity of national provisions’ across Member States.​[17]​ Consequently, directives may prescribe the Member States exact obligations to be transposed into national legislation. The Chocolate directive is still a pre-eminent example.​[18]​ Conversely, regulations have been adopted that have needed substantial fleshing out by national legislatures in order to become fully effective. An example is Article 5(1) of Regulation No 1782/2003/EC on support schemes under the common agricultural policy which provides: 

‘Member States shall ensure that all agricultural land, especially land which is no longer used for production purposes, is maintained in good agricultural and environmental condition. Member States shall define, at national or regional level, minimum requirements for good agricultural and environmental condition on the basis of the framework set up in Annex IV, taking into account the specific characteristics of the areas concerned, including soil and climatic condition, existing farming systems, land use, crop rotation, farming practices, and farm structures. (…).’

The open-textured wording (“good agricultural condition”) as well as the Member States’ discretion to establish minimum requirements leave the national authorities ample policy discretion, despite the legislative act being a regulation. This example, moreover, highlights that the choice of the legislative act in practice depends primarily on the policy area concerned.​[19]​ Regulations dominate in areas such as agriculture, competition law and transport, whereas environmental policy, immigration law and EU company law are regulated mainly by way of directives. The preference for directives in the field of company law, but also in the field of consumer protection (measures such as the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive)​[20]​ – as well as the prescribed use of directives in the field of criminal law – must be understood from the desire to enable the Member States to integrate all aspects of an area into a single, coherent system of law (e.g. Civil or Criminal Codes). The adoption of directives in such fields in therefore not based on the impact or the importance of the EU acts on the national legal systems.

The distinction between directives and regulations is, thus, a too ambiguous factor to help in understanding the impact of EU law on the Member States’ legal orders. The European legislature enjoys substantial discretion to opt for either regulations or directives which has resulted in a legislative practice 

3.2 The catalogue of competences and the principle of conferral

The catalogue of competences (art. 2-6 TFEU) was included in the Treaty of Lisbon with the objective of creating and increasing clarity with regard to powers of the European Union. This would imply that it would be directly relevant for assessing the EU’s legislative impact. The catalogue was, nevertheless, hardly a novelty but rather a summary and bringing together of the various competences to be found throughout the TFEU.​[21]​ The catalogue of competences is non-exhaustive, as a fixed system was considered by some undesirable given the open and flexible nature of European integration.​[22]​ Moreover, given that most EU powers have been classified as shared powers (most notably in the field of the Internal Market and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice), the actual density and intensity of EU law depends on the extent to which the EU legislature has actually exercised its powers. A last issue relates to the difficulty of distinguishing between policy areas. Since the ECJ’s ruling on the Tobacco Advertisement Directive​[23]​, measures based on article 114 TFEU (previously: article 95 TEC) need not necessarily be aimed primarily at improving the adequate functioning of the internal market (although the ECJ ruled that the provision entails no general power to regulate the internal market). The level of unpredictability of the use of the legal basis is therefore quite high. Apart from the category of exclusive EU competences, the competence catalogue has, therefore, limited use for assessing the legislative impact of the European Union. 

3.3 Methods of integration
The distinction between various forms of legal integration in the European Union is probably the legal tool which is most closely related to assessing the impact on national legal orders. This is particularly true for the concepts of minimum and total harmonization. The scope of national discretion is the key factor that defines the difference between these two forms of integration. EU legal acts based on minimum harmonization indicate that the Member States are free to maintain or introduce stricter rules. The national legislature retains its legislative authority to shape these additional policies. By contrast, in case of total harmonization the Member States lose the power to derogate from the provisions of the EU legal act apart from the exceptions explicitly provided for by the legal act at issue.​[24]​ Member States then ‘transform’ into executive agencies of the EU.​[25]​ 

The method of harmonization is therefore prima facie a very powerful legal tool to determine the legislative impact of EU law on the Member States. Several problems arise in this context as well, though. First, EU legislation is are usually classified into categories of harmonization methods only by legal doctrine. Acts that explicitly specify the level of harmonization are indeed quite scarce. Second, the classification of methods of harmonization is not only based on the impact on Member States. Barnard has distinguished exhaustive, optional, partial, minimum and reflexive harmonization.​[26]​ These concepts relate only in part to the level of national discretion they provide. The concept of optional harmonization, for instance, relates to choices for individuals or industry, but Member States are left with no substantive policy discretion or options to choose from in the implementation of EU legislation. Mutual recognition as a method of integration is even more difficult to pin down in terms of legislative impact. On the one hand, mutual recognition instruments allow Member States to maintain national legislation and practices without replacing them with uniform EU standards. On the other hand, laws of other Member States gain equal status to that of domestic law in case of cross border situations. Thus, mutual recognition requires Member States to apply foreign laws to cross border situations.​[27]​ Lastly, the distinction between minimum harmonization and total harmonization has been blurred by the obligations to which Member States are subjected in the context of shaping stricter rules. Especially the desire to curb so-called gold-plating has effectively limited the freedom of Member States. 






The area of criminal law is closely connected to the nation state and the monopoly of the state on the use of violence. Moreover, criminal law has a long history of being a central area of activity for states. The influence of the EU on criminal law bears strong marks of this state-centered context.​[28]​ EU criminal and criminal procedural law is fragmented in nature and is aimed at regulating only certain specific aspects of criminal and criminal procedural law. By contrast, at the national level criminal law and criminal procedural law have been developed as comprehensive and coherent systems of law, usually by way of Codes of law.​[29]​ However, the influence of the EU on national criminal law has substantially increased over the years at least in terms of the number of legislative acts that have been adopted at the EU level. In particular the Treaty of Lisbon, which enabled easier decision making on EU criminal law matters, has paved the way for this intensified role for the EU.

The starting point for assessing the impact of the EU is the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) which lays down the legal possibilities for the EU to act in this field. The applicable legal bases determine quite specifically the type of measures the EU may adopt, indeed far more so than most other legal bases in the TFEU. With the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the scope and conditions for applying the various legal bases have been further specified.​[30]​ These specific legal bases explain part of the fragmentation of European criminal law: the European legislature has not been attributed with a general power to harmonize criminal law. According to the articles 82-89 TFEU cooperation in criminal matters must be based on the principle of mutual recognition and the regulation of cross border situations. Article 83 TFEU prescribes that EU substantive criminal law measures must be limited to minimum rules in areas of particularly serious crime. The adoption of measures with regard to criminal procedure is subject to similar constraints. The principle of mutual recognition is the leading principle here as well, and respect for differences between Member States (art. 82 (2) TFEU) a substantial constrain on the development of EU criminal law. More coherency, however, has been brought by article 83 (2) TFEU that connects other EU policy areas to EU criminal law cooperation. Whenever in one of these other EU policy fields criminalization is deemed necessary, article 83 (2) TFEU serves as an additional legal basis. In the pre-Lisbon era, no institutional link needed to be established with the EU criminal law legal bases, based on a decision of the ECJ.​[31]​ 

The principle of mutual recognition presupposes that the Member States’ criminal law systems remain intact, but that the borders between national systems may not constitute an obstacle for cross border law enforcement. Not all EU legislation in the area may be easily understood in these terms, though. The previous Framework Decision on the Status of the Victim in criminal proceedings​[32]​ and its successor the Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime​[33]​ are neither based on mutual recognition, nor on the regulation of cross border issues. Instead, uniform standards for the protection of victims are set and the status of all victims in criminal proceedings is regulated, and not just of those victims involved in cross-border crime. The Framework decision and the Directive have therefore affected national criminal procedure integrally.​[34]​ Moreover, whereas the Framework decision contained several open-textured provisions, the level of specificity and concreteness of the new Directive is much higher. It has further strengthened the position of victims by extending their rights and extending the scope of application of the legislative act (e.g. to include family members of deceased victims).​[35]​ The legislative freedom of the Member States has therefore effectively been diminished. 

Other legislation in the field remains closer within the treaty framework. The most well- known and commented upon example of EU criminal law concerns the Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant.​[36]​ This legislative act is indeed both concerned with cross border situations and based on the principle of mutual recognition. Unlike pre-existing international agreements on extradition, the European arrest warrant has substantially reduced national discretion of the executing Member State. Mutual trust in the judicial authorities of the Member States is, thus, key, which makes the impact of the Framework decision considerably higher than what could prima facie be expected. The impact of the Framework decision relates first to the diminished discretion of the executing authorities. In substantive terms, the executing authorities must apply the grounds for arrest and/or surrender (the listed crimes of article 2 (2) or the crimes which may be subject to the double criminality condition of article 3 (4) of the Framework decision) although some discretion exists in applying the facultative refusal grounds (article 4). As a result of the fixed time limits and the obligatory reduction of formalities contained in the Framework decision, the procedural constraints on the executing authorities are perhaps even more compelling. Member States’ legislatures have equally seen their discretion diminished. A first indication is article 2(2) of the Framework decision that contains the list of crimes for which the double criminality test has been lifted. Also the fact that the refusal grounds have been exhaustively regulated by the Framework decision greatly diminishes national discretion.​[37]​ The high impact of the Framework decision is in a more general sense demonstrated by two of the main issues that mark its implementation in the Member States. First, the non-application of the proportionality principle, meaning the systematic issuing of European arrest warrants for the surrender of persons in relation to very minor offences, which puts mutual trust between the Member States under pressure.​[38]​ The second issue regards the respect of fundamental rights. Executing Member States are limited in protecting the fundamental rights of requested persons and calls for a better balance between the principle of mutual recognition an fundamental rights protection have been made.​[39]​
 
For some legislation in the area, the effects on Member States are modest. An example are the framework decisions on counter-terrorism measures.​[40]​ The objective of these framework decisions is to oblige the Member States to qualify specific actions as terrorist crimes. However, the framework decisions apply to acts which national legislatures have already qualified as criminal offences. The effect of the framework decisions is that the maximum penalties which may be imposed to such crimes is increased by 1/3.​[41]​ The Framework Decisions further contain a number of conditions to be applied by the Member States, but the latter retain considerable discretion as to the choice to which offences they want to apply the framework decision. The Netherlands have, for instance, included recruiting for the jihad to the list of terrorist crimes which was not a binding obligation on the basis of the Framework decisions.​[42]​

The foregoing represents a ‘quick-scan’ of the effects of EU criminal law. The following conclusions may be drawn on the basis thereof. First, the legal bases for EU action from the TFEU is relevant here given the level of specification contained therein on the possible involvement of the in criminal law matters. The actual legislation adopted not always reflects the scope of these legal bases though. In this sense, the relevance of the  legal basis is constrained by legislative practice and focusing merely on the legal bases may result in an underestimation of the EU’s impact on the Member States. Second, the effects of EU law in this area greatly depend on the content of the applicable legislation and the scope for national decision-making they offer. In case of counter-terrorism measures, EU legislation provides merely an addition to national criminal law and leaves the Member States considerable policy discretion. Oppositely, the European Arrest Warrant, although being completely in line with the Treaty framework, has had a high impact on the Member States. Here, it has also been national discretion – but now the lack thereof – which is the explanatory factor. 

4.2 Migration law
EU migration law as such may hardly be qualified as a system of law. Indeed, instead of a single general migration policy, separate subsystems of migration law are in force for visas, asylum and immigration.​[43]​ Moreover, internal migration (i.e. between EU Member States) is governed by Internal market law and EU citizenship law and constitutes, therefore, a complete separate system of law of its own. In this section, I will focus on external migration, i.e. the policies in migration from third countries. 

Following the transfer of migration policies to the Community pillar after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the EU legislature has adopted a wide range of legislation. Characteristic of EU migration legislation is that it regulates specific types of migrants or situations. Groups such as researchers,​[44]​ EU family members​[45]​, seasonal workers​[46]​ and asylum seekers​[47]​ are all governed by specific sets of rules. The  focus in EU law on the status of migrants stimulates the Member States to arrange their legal systems accordingly as this will facilitate the implementation of EU law. This may, however, clash with pre-existing national systems of migration law. The Dutch system of migration law provides a case in point. The main distinction that is made in the Dutch Aliens Act 2000 is between residence permits for an indefinite period and fixed periods. As a result of having to implement EU law, Dutch migration law has introduced numerous provisions regarding the status of the applicant or migrant. Thus, the main distinction made on the basis of length of stay has been pushed to the background. This change has been qualified as a ‘silent revolution’ of the national migration law system.​[48]​

A second characteristic is the balance between the rights of individual applicants and the interests of the Member States to control and to restrict migration.​[49]​ This balance is visible in the simultaneous existence of legal instruments such as the Returns Directive and the Directive on Mutual recognition of Expulsion decisions​[50]​ on the one hand and the Family Reunification Directive and the Directive on Minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers​[51]​ on the other. The first two primarily protect Member States’ interests to control migration flows, whereas the latter – at least at first sight – primarily protects the rights for individual third country nationals. Yet, a closer look at these latter legislative acts reveals that the balance between Member States’ and individuals’ interests has in fact been incorporated within these individual acts as they also contain provisions in the interests of the Member States’ interests to control migration. The Family Reunification Directive contains indeed a number of conditions for individuals to comply with, some of which are facultative for the Member States. Conversely, the Returns Directive contains provisions to protect the principle of non-refoulement, the best interests of the child, the right to family life and duty to take into account the state of health of the third country national concerned (article 5 of the Directive). This directive may, thus, equally been seen as a balance between the interests of individuals and controlling migration. Obviously, the impact of EU law is particularly felt at the national level if Member States prefer a different balance in the protection of individuals’ rights and the control of migration flows than provided for by EU legislation. 

A third characteristic of EU migration law is the strong influence of international law, especially international refugee law. Obviously, this creates particular complexities when assessing the impact of EU law on national legal orders. Substantial parts of EU asylum law may be seen as an elaboration of international treaties and agreements.​[52]​ The effects of such legislation on national legislatures must be weighed differently in light of the fact that Member States party to such international agreements are already subject to the obligations laid down therein. 

The next step is to view concrete legislation in the field. Again, the following is not intended to create a comprehensive analysis of all legislation in the field. Rather, a single legislative act is analyzed in closer detail to reveal what factors determine legislative impact on the Member States. The Family Reunification Directive is one of the most important legislative instruments in the field, but has also extensively been analyzed as to its nature, its effects in the Member States and its relation to other legislation in the field.​[53]​ 

The first observation is that the right which is the central element of this directive, the right to family reunification, is not established by this directive itself,​[54]​ but is based on pre-existing international provisions (most notably articles 8 and 14 EConHR).​[55]​ This has, however, been contested by the ECJ that has stated that:  “(…) [t]hese various instruments (…) do not create for the members of a family an individual right to be allowed to enter the territory of a State and cannot be interpreted as denying States a certain margin of appreciation.” Peers has however convincingly argued that the right to family life may indeed include entry and residency rights for family members.​[56]​ In this view, the Directive merely regulates the implementation of the that right. Following this line of reasoning, the purpose of the directive is merely to determine the conditions for the exercise of that right (as is stated by article 1). In the above mentioned case at the ECJ, initiated by the European Parliament, the ECJ tested the legality of the directive in the light of these and other international provisions.​[57]​ The ECJ concluded that the directive itself is in line with these provisions and that the application of the directive by the Member States should be governed by these provisions.​[58]​ The directive applies to third country nationals who seek family reunification or formation with other third country nationals (sponsors) in the EU. EU citizens who seek family reunification benefit from a more liberal regime.​[59]​ EU citizens who reside in their own country and seek reunification with third country nationals are excluded from the scope of application of the Directive as well. Their situation is governed by national legislation. This may lead to the unsatisfactory situation that Member States may treat national sponsors less favourably than EU citizens or third country nationals.​[60]​ Articles 7 and 8 of the directive list a number of conditions that Member States may impose on sponsors (inter alia accommodation, insurance and means of subsistence) as well as on their family members (most notably integration requirements). 

The directive contains various minimum provisions, allowing the Member States to pursue more liberal immigration policies. They may extend the group of relatives eligible for family reunification to include dependent parents, unmarried adult children and unmarried partners (article 4.2 of the Directive). The Directive, furthermore, contains a general provision enabling the Member States to adopt or maintain more favourable provisions (article 3 [5]). More discretion for national authorities is found in article 15 that concerns the right of residence for family members. The Member States may grant an autonomous right of residence (i.e. independent of the sponsor) before five years of residence and decide upon the status of that right; they may limit the right of residence in case of break down of the family relationship (paragraph 1); they may issue and autonomous residence permit in case of widowhood, divorce, separation, or death of first-degree relatives (paragraph 3) and although the granting of such autonomous residence permits is obligatory in case of ‘particularly difficult circumstances’, it is for the Member States to define what circumstances qualify as such.​[61]​

In light of the many possibilities that the Directive offers to Member States to make their own policy choices, the impact of the directive is modest. This point seems to be strengthened by the right to family life being enshrined in international legal instruments. On both ends, the directive’s added value would thus be limited. Yet, the earlier mentioned decision of the ECJ sheds a different light on the matter. It suggests that the added value of the directive, and therefore the impact on national legal orders, lies precisely between the level of the various international legal instruments and the possibilities for Member States to adopt their own policy choices. In consideration 60 of the judgment, the ECJ argues: “Going beyond those provisions (Tvdb: i.e. the provisions of the various international legal instruments), Article 4(1) of the Directive imposes precise positive obligations, with corresponding clearly defined individual rights, on the Member States, since it requires them, in the cases determined by the Directive, to authorize family reunification of certain members of the sponsor’s family, without being left a margin of appreciation.” Thus, the added value of the directive is, first, to define concrete rights for sponsors and their family members and second to impose a binding legal framework on the Member States of conditions and requirements that may be applied. Although international legal instruments in the field contain more than just general principles, the Family Reunification Directive entails, thus, substantially more than a mere codification of these instruments. Similarly, the existence of various possibilities for member states to exert policy discretion may not reveal the fact that the directive contains a comprehensive system of conditions, requirements and rights. One of the consequences thereof is that the Member States may not impose additional requirements.​[62]​

All in all, from the example of EU migration law the following factors that affect the EU’s legislative impact may be identified. First is the scope of application of EU legislation. EU legislative instruments in the area of migration law are usually limited in their scope of application to specific types of migrants. The second factor regards the position of legal acts in the broader system of law of which they form part. The example of the Family Reunification Directive has highlighted that the positioning vis-à-vis the broader system of EU law, the system of national law into which the legal act has to be implemented, but also the applicable instruments of international law are equally important here. The third factor is the existence of national discretion in EU law instruments. Not only the scope, the content and the limitations of the discretion awarded to the Member States are relevant, but also the political sensitivities which define the subject. 

4.3 The Services Directive

The third area to be analyzed here regards the Services Directive.​[63]​ Obviously, this instrument concerns only a single legislative instrument at the EU level, but one with a wide scope of application and thus affecting the Member States in various policies they pursue. Services constitute indeed a significant part of national economies and of the economy of the EU as a whole as well. But the adoption of the Directive has also raised concerns in the Member States, e.g. regarding the risk of social dumping.​[64]​ Thus, the adoption of the directive has been received with extensive political and public attention. 

Several key sectors have been excluded from the scope of application of the Directive, partly in reaction to the concerns that were raised. Some sectors, such as the financial sector and the transport sector, have been excluded because sector-specific EU legislation being applicable in these fields. Other sectors have, however, been excluded to respect national autonomy. Notable examples are health care; social services in the areas of housing, childcare and support to families and persons in need and audiovisual services and taxation. Services of general interest are excluded also in a more general sense.​[65]​

Furthermore, several sectors of national policy have been granted ‘immunity’ from the Services directive, such as social security.​[66]​ In addition, the Services directive is limited to regulating cross-border activities, leaving the Member States the discretion to regulate purely internal matters. It may, however, be undesirable to subject purely domestic situations to a different legal regime than similar situations that happen to include a cross-border element. This is why some Member States have opted to extend the scope of application of specific elements of the Directive to cover purely internal situations as well. Internal providers of services may, thus, benefit from specific elements of the Directive such as administrative simplification and the single point of contact. ​[67]​  This remains, however, a national policy choice. 

A less noticeable aspect of the Services Directive is that is has only to a limited extent created new legal norms. The Directive codifies existing law, most notably provisions on free movement of services and establishment from the TFEU and the interpretation of these provisions by the European Court of Justice. The provisions that lie at the basis of the Services Directive had, therefore, already been developed before the adoption of the Directive. Article 16 section 1 and article 18 section 1 concern the freedom to provide and to receive services whereas Chapter III of the directive contains many provisions that protect the right of free establishment. Obstacles to these freedoms, such as national authorization schemes (articles 9-13), already fell within the scope of application of the treaty provisions and could thus only be upheld in case of a legitimate public interest. In this sense, the key provisions of the directive merely specify the rights and obligations flowing from the treaty provisions rather than constituting these rights and obligations. An earlier draft of the Directive​[68]​ included the so-called country of origin principle to the free movement of services which would have required host states to apply the law of the Member State in which service providers are established. Although this was subject to exceptions, critique on the draft directive focused in particular on this aspect, not only in society and politics, but also in legal writing. Davies argued that including the principle in the Directive would lead to unequal treatment and to centralization, amounting to an unacceptable intrusion into national regulatory autonomy.​[69]​ 

Now that the eventual version of the Directive has reverted to the existing system of fundamental freedoms and their exceptions, the meaning and relevance of the Services Directive differs substantially from legislation in other fields of EU law in which no directly effective treaty provisions exist. The position of a legislative act within the broader framework of EU law is thus an important factor to consider when assessing the influence of EU law.

The Services Directive includes, however, not only a codification of existing law. it contains an important substantive innovation. Article 16 of the Directive allows the Member States to restrict the free movement of services only on grounds of public policy; public security, public health or the protection of the environment. This is a substantial limitation compared to the open wording of the concept of “mandatory requirements” which flows from the Rule of Reason-doctrine. This allows not only for a wide range of public interests to be protected, but leaves the definition thereof primarily in hands of the Member States. The Member States therefore have lost considerable policy discretion with regard to services falling within the scope of the directive.​[70]​ 

Another aspect of the Services Directive relates to its general and horizontal nature that has definitely been preserved, despite the many exceptions to its scope of application. The extensive legislative operations at the Member States’ level to implement the directive are a clear sign thereof. In a valuable study from 2011, the implementation in all but one Member State has been analyzed.​[71]​ It may be concluded from the general comparative report that the Member States have adopted three types of implementing measures.​[72]​ General laws on services have been adopted which come close to providing one on one implementation of the Directive. Second, some Member States have considered the Services Directive as a cause to amend general laws on administrative law, most notably in Germany where it has provided an impetus for ‘(…) simplification, modernization and acceleration of administration, or better administrative proceedings, at the legislative level’.​[73]​ Admittedly, such a profound impact on national law was only found in Germany, but also in a number of other Member States specific changes to administrative law in general have been reported.​[74]​ Third, the Services Directive has led to amendments of existing legislation (or even the adoption of new legislation) in specific sectors. Particularly worth observing is the wide range of policy areas affected by the Directive. In purely domestic contexts, such policy sectors normally stand completely apart. In the UK, inter alia the following acts needed to be amended: the Administration of Justice Act 1987, the Care Standards Act 2000, the Education Act 2002, the Companies Act 2006, the Employment Agencies Act 1973 and several others.​[75]​ This indication of high impact of the Directive is somewhat mitigated by the observation that in countries in which establishment and the provision of services have been less intensively regulated, the impact of the Directive may be considered less substantial.​[76]​ 

The last element to be elaborated upon concerns the nature of the provisions of the Directive, zooming in on the provisions regarding institutional aspects. To facilitate the free movement of services, the Directive contains inter alia the so-called one-stop-shop principle (or Point of Single Contact) to ensure that individuals are not confronted with different institutions and authorities for obtaining permits or other documents. Another institutional aspect concerns the obligation for administrative authorities to cooperate with their counterparts in other Member States. The so-called lex silencio positivo (article 13 (4) of the Directive) is another example. These aspects of the Directive force administrative authorities to work in a specific (possibly different than before) way. This may even lead to a restructuring of the set-up of these authorities. Whereas EU law often contains substantive norms only, the Services Directive takes a further step by including such aspects as well. Many of the discussions (both in political and academic circles) paid more attention to other aspects of the Directive, but the impact of these institutional elements may not be underestimated. 






---  to be further elaborated ---
Despite having received quite some scholarly as well as political attention, the question what the impact of EU legislation is on the Member States remains an intricate and undecided one. Quantitative research has given indications, but these must be valued in light of the methodology from which they have been developed. General legal tools, which may be seen as the first step in developing a more qualitative approach have their drawbacks as well. It has proved to be especially difficult to link the type of legal instrument to the impact of EU law as both regulations and directives differ much in scope, level of detail, and the degree of discretion left to the Member States. The legal basis reveals in some cases more on the impact of EU law (e.g. in the areas of environmental policy and criminal cooperation) but other legal bases, especially the harmonization of the internal market, may be applied to a broad array of legislative acts. The type of harmonization is not a very helpful factor either, mainly because it is often difficult to identify what the exact type of harmonization is. 

The next step taken in this paper was an analysis of three policy areas of EU legislation and identify what factors emerge from these areas as relevant for assessing the impact on Member States. 

The analysis of specific policy fields has also indicated that, besides the above mentioned factors, a number of other more specific factors affect the impact of EU law. The first factor is the scope of EU legislation. The impact of legislation containing very specific sectoral norms must be weighed differently than horizontal provisions affecting a large number of individuals and wide array of policy areas. Prime example regarding the latter is the Services Directive. As EU legislation often involves a codification or a consolidation of existing legislation, EU law has not always substantive implications for society and individuals. The question whether EU law is –substantively- new is, therefore, relevant. Closely linked to this is the question whether EU law is new in the Member States. If legislation already exists in a Member States only the origin changes rather than its effects.

A factor requiring a specific and detailed analysis, regards the degree of policy discretion that is left to the Member States. The measure of national discretion not only depends on the text of the act concerned, but also on its place within the broader system of EU law and its objectives, and, ultimately, on the interpretation of the European Court of Justice. The existence of national discretion may be explicit (e.g. by specifying options for the Member States to choose from) but may also be more implicit. Moreover, national discretion may concern the further fleshing out of EU objectives in further detail but it may also allow the Member States to balance public interest to an extent provided for by the EU legislative act. The Family Reunification Directive is an example of the latter. Thus, the issue of national discretion in EU legislation is a complicated one which deserves more scholarly as well as political attention. 
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